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COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF 
DEFERENCE:  
A BAD TIME TO BE ACCUSED 
David M. Paciocco
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Charter1 remains the single most important legal instrument in this country 
for the protection of the rights of accused persons. One need only read the dramatic 
decision in United States of America v. Burns2 to see this.3 Still, in terms of its 
ability to protect the innocent and other values important to accused persons, the 
Charter is not what it once was. I am not referring so much to the fact that, Burns 
aside, the Charter did not ground any startling, pro-defence decisions in the past 
year.4 Nor am I referring to a retrenchment on any of the specific rights, such as the 
_______________________________________________________________ 
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. This paper was originally presented at the 
April 6, 2001 conference entitled “2000 Constitutional Cases: Fourth Annual Analysis of the 
Constitutional Decisions of the S.C.C.” sponsored by the Professional Development Program at Osgoode 
Hall Law School. 
1
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2
 (2001), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2001 SCC 7. 
3
 In Burns, the Supreme Court of Canada used the Charter to override the discretion of the 
Minister of Justice to extradite young Burns and Rafay, without securing assurances that the Americans 
would not kill them. Even though the Court accepted the authority of the Minister of Justice to extradite 
persons facing capital punishment in exceptional circumstances, the decision in Burns will no doubt be 
regarded as the leading international precedent supporting an abolitionist position. In terms of its social 
merits, it is a powerful, compelling decision. I nonetheless have some concerns about the legal 
techniques employed, which I will discuss below. 
4
 There have, of course, been modest successes by accused persons. The child pornography section 
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, section 163.1, now recognizes exceptions that would not exist 
but for the Charter: R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2000 SCC 2. As a result of the Charter, the reverse 
onus provision in section 152(3) of the Customs Act can no longer be used to put an onus on an importer 
to establish that the materials being imported are not obscene. Moreover, arbitrary acts by customs 
officials in targetting and seizing erotic homosexual material can now be more easily resisted as the result 
of a declaration describing discriminatory practices and identifying shortcomings in the administration of 
112 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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withering of the Hunter v. Southam Inc.5 standard in the last decade. I am referring 
instead to generic developments having to do with the conception of constitutional 
adjudication. In particular, the Charter is not what it once was because of: 
 
 the replacement of the state with the victim or future victims as the 
opposing party in constitutional adjudication; 
 
 the recognition of pro-state “principles of fundamental justice” in defining 
rights; 
 
 the “no trump” doctrine; and 
 
 confusion between the concepts of “dialogue “and “deference” 
 
Together, these four developments substantially undermine the utility of the 
Charter to accused persons. While none of these developments is new to the 2000-
2001 jurisprudence, the influence of at least the first three of these developments 
has been confirmed in the past year. 
II. REPLACING THE STATE WITH PRESENT AND  
FUTURE VICTIMS 
The classic conception of the criminal prosecution as a wrong against the state 
that is prosecuted by the state has a number of significant implications. Most are 
beyond the scope of this paper. The key implication relevant to the current 
discussion is that conceiving of the prosecution of crime as state conduct is 
absolutely essential to the survival of integral liberty regarding principles for 
                                                                                                                                
the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.): Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada 
(Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, 2000 SCC 69.  
The Charter has also had an important impact on the interpretation of criminal legislation. In R. v. 
Araujo, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, 2000 SCC 65, section 8 of the Charter was used to sustain a restrictive 
interpretation of section 186(1)(b) of the Criminal Code relating to intercepted communications. Justice 
Lebel, writing for a unanimous Court, interpreted section 186(1)(b)‟s requirement (at paras. 27 and 29 
respectively) that “other investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed” as meaning that there must be 
“no other reasonable alternative method of investigation, in the circumstances of the particular criminal 
inquiry.” More importantly, in R. v. Darrach (2000), 148 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.), although the provision 
was capable of a more aggressive exclusionary interpretation, the Supreme Court upheld a construction 
of section 276 that reflects the essential requirements of the principles of fundamental justice, as defined 
in R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.  
5
 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. See, for example, R. v. Monney (1999), 24 C.R. (5th) 97 (S.C.C.) 
(customs searches); R. v. Caslake (1998), 13 C.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.) (searches incidental to arrest); R. v. 
Jacques (1996), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) (roadside detention); R. v. McInlay Transport Ltd., [1990] 1 
S.C.R. 627 (administrative searches); R. v. M. (M.R.) (1998), 20 C.R. (5th) 197 (S.C.C.) (searches by 
school authorities); R. v. Godoy (1998), 21 C.R. (5th) 205 (S.C.C.) (emergencies). 
(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)    Competing Constitutional Rights 113 
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accused persons. When the role of the state as the protagonist is forgotten, 
minimized or thrust into the background, those principles wither. They become 
anemic. Remembering that the state is the prosecutor and that a prosecution 
represents an effort by the state to deprive an individual of liberty is nothing less 
than the “open sesame” to vital rights in the criminal law context. By contrast, if 
we view a particular contest as being between private individuals, the impediments 
of fundamental principle largely fall away.  
To see this, one need merely contrast our criminal process with our civil 
process. Whereas the criminally accused person has the right to remain silent, the 
defendant is examined for discovery. Whereas the criminally accused person is 
presumed innocent absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant need 
merely be “probably responsible.” Whereas Crown evidence will be more readily 
excluded than defence evidence, in matters of proof, a plaintiff and defendant are 
treated equally. Whereas an accused person can prevent the state from relying on 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, a civil defendant cannot. Whereas accused 
persons are sentenced, in part, based on what is in their own best interest, the civil 
defendant is liable to provide remedy according solely to the harm done to the 
plaintiff.  
These differences are not coincidental. They emerge from our long-standing 
acceptance that state interests are subordinate to identifiable individual rights, and 
from appreciation that a criminal prosecution is a punitive, degrading exercise 
instigated by the state against an individual. It has been our tradition, our political 
ethos, that classic utility, the ability of the state to pursue the greatest good for the 
greatest number, is subject to limits in the form of individual rights. I cannot put it 
any better than Joseph Rawls has: 
 
It has seemed to many philosophers, and it appears to be supported by the convictions 
of common sense, that we distinguish as a matter of principle between the claims of 
liberty and right on the one hand and the desirability of increasing aggregate social 
welfare on the other; and that we give a certain priority, if not absolute weight, to the 
former. Each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice, 
or some say, on natural right, which even the welfare of every one else cannot 
override. Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by the greater 
good shared by others.... Therefore in a just society the basic liberties are taken for 
granted and the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to 
the calculus of social interests.6 
 
Nor can I put the same general point more powerfully, in the context of the 
Charter, than Justice McLachlin, as she then was, did in the sympathetic case of 
Sue Rodriguez, who wanted to die with dignity: 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
6
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), at 28. 
114 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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The principles of fundamental justice require that each person, considered 
individually, be treated fairly by the law. The fear that abuse may arise if an individual 
is permitted that which she is wrongly denied plays no part at this initial stage. In 
short, it does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice that Sue Rodriguez 
be disallowed what is available to others merely because it is possible that other 
people, at some other time, may suffer... As Lamer C.J. stated in [R. v. Swain], supra, 
at p. 977: 
 
 It is not appropriate for the state to thwart the exercise of the accused‟s right by 
attempting to bring societal interests into the principles of fundamental justice 
and to thereby limit an accused‟s s. 7 rights. Societal interests are to be dealt 
with under s. 1 of the Charter, where the Crown has the burden of proving that 
the impugned law is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. In 
other words, it is my view that any balancing of societal interests against the 
individual right guaranteed by s. 7 should take place within the confines of s. 1 
of the Charter. 
 
I add that it is not generally appropriate that the [Charter] complainant be obliged to 
negate societal interests at the s. 7 stage, where the burden lies upon her, but that the 
matter be left for s. 1, where the burden lies on the state.7 
 
It is no secret that in a rights-based system, the concept that individual rights can 
limit social utility stands as a frustrating impediment to many initiatives that might 
make the streets safer. Consider, for example, the most general but most crucial of 
all individual rights tenable in a criminal system: “[t]he right of the innocent not to 
be convicted,”8 that is, the fundamental tenet of our legal system that an innocent 
person not be punished.9  According to our most basic conception of civil liberties, 
society can never claim the right to punish the innocent, or to risk the punishment 
of the innocent, in order to advance what it perceives to be its own interests. To the 
extent, however, that the prosecution of crime works at all, society would be safer 
if we convicted the probably guilty rather than insisting on proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Sacrifice a few innocent persons to catch a good number of 
guilty ones, and you protect future victims. Consider, as well, the bulwark of the 
principle against convicting the innocent, namely the right to present full answer 
and defence. To the extent that the principle of full answer and defence causes 
collateral damage to privacy, stress and anxiety to witnesses, or the uncomfortable 
spectacle of witnesses being challenged and doubted, society might choose not to 
favour full answer and defence. The same can be said of any fundamental right. 
Search homes, compel answers, deny access to counsel, lock criminals up for good 
based on what they are likely to do, and the streets will be safer. Without question, 
_______________________________________________________________ 
7
 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 621-22. 
8
 R. v. McClure (2001), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 513, 2001 SCC 14, at para. 39. 
9
 R. v. Seaboyer, supra, note 4, at 611. 
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in the language of utility, the existence of individual rights impedes the flexibility 
of society to make decisions based on what it perceives, from time to time, to be 
the greatest good for the greatest number. In a constitutional system, of course, a 
charter of rights is the legal mechanism for ensuring that those individual rights are 
not sacrificed by the state for what it believes, at a given point in time, to be the 
greatest good for the greatest number. A charter is not always an instrument for 
social utility. Depending on society‟s mood, it can be the villain that impedes 
social utility. 
Of course, as the Rodriguez passage quoted above demonstrates, in our system, 
no rights are guaranteed absolutely. Our Charter, a quintessentially Canadian 
document, provides for compromise on fundamental rights in the interest of social 
utility, but only subject to what are professed to be carefully controlled limits. As 
everyone knows, apart altogether from section 33, the Charter provides for 
reasonable limitations on fundamental rights that may advance social utility where 
those limits are “demonstrably [justifiable] in a free and democratic society.”10 In a 
system like this, the two most obvious strategies for reducing rights are to define 
those rights narrowly, or to be aggressive in identifying reasonable limits. We have 
witnessed both.11   
There is, however, a third strategy, one that is more dangerous and destructive 
of individual rights. That strategy is simple. Remove the issue from the constraints 
of limitations on state action by notionally removing “the state” as the protagonist 
who is limiting the right in question. Conceive, instead, of issues that have 
constitutional dimension as controversies between private actors rather than 
between the state and an individual.12  This done, these competing rights can be 
“balanced” free of the constraints described by Rawls. Limitations are not being 
_______________________________________________________________ 
10
  Section 1. 
11
 For example, the central principle of sentencing that the sentence fit the crime — the principle 
of proportionality — is not a principle of fundamental justice. Instead, our Charter protects solely against 
grossly disproportionate sentences. In effect, we have declared that Parliament has the right to create 
disproportionate sentences — sentences that do not fit the crime — so long as it does not reach the point 
of gross disproportion: see R. v. Morrisey, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, and R. v. Latimer (2000), 193 D.L.R. 
(4th) 577, 2001 SCC 1. With respect to section 1, the process of making it less difficult to satisfy has 
been an ongoing one of long standing: see even the first edition of Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian 
Criminal Law (Scarborough, Ont: Carswell, 1991), at 8-20, where this trend had already been observed 
and chronicled. 
12
 A hint of the impact of this can be seen using the example of how section 1 is to operate. 
There has been recognition, at least from time to time, that if Charter rights are being used in the context 
of a dispute between private individuals, or groups with the legislation in question merely regulating 
competing interests, a more deferential approach to Parliament is possible. Where, on the other hand, the 
state is the singular antagonist, in other words, if the state is seeking to limit rights in order to pursue its 
own interests, less deference can be given. See, for example, Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, and then the retrenchment in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199. 
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imposed on the rights of the accused as the result of the “calculus of social 
interest.” Instead, they are being imposed out of deference to competing rights. 
The accused, of course, is relying on constitutional rights, those higher rights 
that are guaranteed precisely so that they will not be compromised, in the absence 
of demonstrable justification, in the interests of social utility. If there is to be a 
contest between competing rights, then, it must be between competing 
constitutional rights, given that a constitutional right will notionally trump a non-
constitutional claim. All that it takes to turn a constitutional claim by the accused 
against the state into a private dispute is to create constitutional rights in the 
complainant, or in other witnesses, or even in future victims, rights that are 
notionally abridged through the enjoyment by the accused of his or her 
constitutional rights. Those rights can be defined broadly, loosely and without 
careful technical evaluation, so long as they are proclaimed to exist. Do this, and 
you neutralize the rights of the accused, particularly if you then proclaim that no 
constitutional rights automatically trump other rights. Do this, and the ultimate 
balancing between rights can be done, free of any impediments that would limit the 
ability of the state to compromise rights. Do this, and the state does not even have 
to demonstrably justify anything under section 1. It is, at best, no more than the 
passive observer, or, at worst, no more than the honest broker between competing 
rights. In the meantime, once the dust settles, it is the state which can then 
prosecute the accused free of the impediments of individual rights. This, then, is 
the strategy. Push the state into the backdrop in constitutional adjudication, and the 
traditional interdiction against compromising rights in the interests of social utility 
disappears without the need to even worry about whether the state can meet its 
burden of justification under section 1. This is how fundamental rights enjoyed by 
accused persons can be disemboweled. 
I am describing, of course, precisely what has happened with full answer and 
defence adjudication under the Charter. Attempts by the accused to insist on 
individual rights to obtain access to evidence in a proceeding brought by the state 
in what the state perceives to be the interest of social utility are being adjudicated 
as if the state is not the protagonist. Instead, notwithstanding that in litigation it 
invariably supports the rights claimed in opposition to the accused, the state is seen 
as a neutral, objective arbiter of competing constitutional rights — competing 
constitutional rights between the accused on the one hand, and victims, both 
current and future, on the other. The result has been to blunt the force of 
constitutional claims of access to evidence.  
The move to push the state into the background in constitutional, criminal 
adjudication has been an evolutionary one. Take the example of the Court‟s 
response to the ability of the state to limit access to evidence by accused persons, 
in the interests of encouraging reporting of sexual offences. In R. v. Seaboyer,13 the 
_______________________________________________________________ 
13
 Supra, note 4. 
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Court was asked to accept, altogether apart from section 1, that depriving accused 
persons of access to relevant evidence which revealed the sexual experiences of 
complainants could be justified because of fear that to permit access would 
discourage reporting of the crime. For the majority, Justice McLachlin, as she then 
was, approached that question by examining whether, in a state prosecution against 
an accused, the state can prefer considerations of social utility to the right of the 
accused to defend himself or herself effectively without violating the Charter. Her 
response was resounding and clear: 
 
The argument based on the reporting of sexual offences similarly fails to justify the 
wide reach of s. 276. ... To accept that persuasive evidence for the defence can be 
categorically excluded on the ground that it may encourage reporting and convictions 
is ... to say either (a) that we assume the defendant‟s guilt; or (b) that the defendant 
must be hampered in his defence so that genuine rapists can be put down. Neither 
alternative conforms to our notions of fundamental justice.14 
 
When we conceive of the contest as between society and an accused, and ask 
whether, in the interests of society, the accused should be deprived of evidence that 
may raise a reasonable doubt about guilt, the contest is not even close. Notions of 
fundamental justice prevent the state from achieving the benefit of encouraging 
reporting on the backs of individual accused persons who might, if access to 
evidence is granted, ultimately prove to be innocent.  
Fast forward eight years to 1999. By 1999, according to R. v. Mills,15 altogether 
apart from section 1, the Constitution now enables judges to take into account, in 
deciding whether to provide access to the therapeutic or private records of a 
complainant, the impact that the order would have on the readiness of other 
complainants to report sexual offences. Judges may do so, the Court held, as long 
as they consider and balance competing factors, and acknowledge that this factor 
(along with the prospect of discouraging therapy for complainants) “will likely 
arise in every case and may be more readily supported by evidence, and take them 
into account accordingly.”16  In other words, judges are not to give undue weight to 
the impact of production on reporting, but even bearing this caution in mind, 
encouraging reporting is now accepted as a counter-weight to production. By 
necessary implication, Mills contemplates that the perceived impact of production 
or disclosure on general reporting habits might make a difference in some cases, 
tipping the balance against access to evidence.  
This past year, the same issue arose again, this time in R. v. Darrach.17 As 
Seaboyer had, Darrach involved a Charter challenge to the “rape shield” provision 
_______________________________________________________________ 
14
 Id., at 617. 
15
 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668. 
16
 Id., at para. 142. 
17
 Supra, note 4. 
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of the Criminal Code, the successor provision that had been passed in response to 
Seaboyer. One of the grounds of challenge related to the fact that section 276(2)(c) 
requires defence evidence to have “significant probative value that is not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of 
justice” (emphasis added) before it can be admitted. The Court interpreted 
“significant” as meaning that “the evidence is not to be so trifling as to be 
incapable, in the context of all the evidence, of raising a reasonable doubt.”18  It 
then went on to affirm that even significant evidence can be excluded if it is 
“substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration 
of justice” (emphasis added), including “society‟s interest in encouraging the 
reporting of sexual assault offences.”19 Again, this was done not using section 1, 
but in the context of defining the right to full answer and defence. Consider the 
implications if this is to be taken literally. Evidence capable of raising a reasonable 
doubt can be excluded in order to encourage the reporting of sexual assaults20 
without violating the Charter. 
How did this happen? What changed to enable the Charter to tolerate denying 
accused persons of significant information about their innocence in the pursuit of 
social utility, without the need to even get to section 1? What has happened is that 
we changed the way we view the issue. Whereas once it was dealt with as an issue 
between the state and the accused, 
 
Mills [and Darrach approached it as] a conflict among ... three Charter principles: full 
answer and defence, privacy and equality.... The Court defined these rights 
relationally: „the scope of the right to make full answer and defence must be 
determined in light of privacy and equality rights of complainants and witnesses.21 
 
Mills and Darrach were not viewed as cases in which the state, in the pursuit of 
social utility, was attempting to deprive the accused of his fundamental 
constitutional right to gain access to evidence. The state was simply brokering a 
dispute between the competing rights of private actors and, as such, could 
accomplish indirectly the very consequence that it could not accomplish directly. It 
could conduct a criminal trial in which it was attempting to deprive the accused of 
his liberty, and in which the ability of the accused to defend himself was abridged, 
even denied, because of the calculus of the social interest in such things as 
encouraging reporting, enabling complainants to seek therapy and preserving 
confidential relations.  
_______________________________________________________________ 
18
 Id., at para 39. 
19
 Section 276(3)(b).  
20
 It is true that there are a number of competing considerations, but if this matter can be 
considered at all, it is capable of making the difference. 
21
 R. v. Darrach, supra, note 4, at para. 28. 
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I want to be clear. I have no concern with competing considerations like privacy 
interests or any other matters of public utility being considered. Of course, they 
should be considered in opposition to constitutional claims. It is evident from the 
prior discussion, however, that what I do have grave concerns about is the practice 
of identifying constitutional rights in third parties that can be given presumptive 
weight equal to the constitutional rights of the accused, and then tendered in a 
criminal trial between the accused and the state, in opposition to the accused‟s 
efforts to defend himself or herself against the state. That troubles me because the 
ultimate effect of giving constitutional status to interests preferred by the state is to 
deprive the constitutional rights possessed by the accused of their very essence as 
constitutional rights. In particular, giving constitutional status to interests preferred 
by the state deprives the constitutional rights possessed by the accused of the 
presumptively superior status they were to have when tendered against opposing 
state interests. Conferring presumptive weight, after all, is the whole point in 
recognizing rights as constitutional ones.  
I have also long had, and continue to have, concerns about the ease with which 
competing rights are identified. We have done so without subjecting those rights 
claims to the kind of Charter analysis that other rights claims are subjected to. 
Clearly, complainants do have expectations of privacy in personal records, but, as I 
understand it, the Charter is only violated where it is the state that is seeking to 
invade expectations of privacy. Is the Charter really violated, then, when a private 
citizen like an accused seeks to defeat the expectations of privacy of a complainant 
in order to protect himself or herself against the state in a proceeding between him 
or her and the state? It strikes me that it takes an attenuated theory of state action, 
one that disregards the substance of what is happening, to characterize the process 
by which an accused seeks to defend himself or herself against the state as 
involving state action. Yet, the authority never discusses how the state action 
doctrine is avoided because we have never subjected assertions of competing 
constitutional rights to the crucible of legal analysis.  
I continue to be troubled, as well, with the claim that “equality” rights are 
implicated by the prosecution of sexual offences. As I understand the law of 
equality, a sexual offence complainant would be unable to meet the relevant legal 
test if that complainant were to initiate a constitutional challenge to any of the rules 
of law that have been at issue in these constitutional claims. Despite this, we are 
quick to proclaim section 15 rights without the impediment of legal analysis.22  
_______________________________________________________________ 
22
 I accept, of course, that men are, in hugely disproportionate numbers, the sexual offenders, and 
that, leaving children of both sexes aside, it is most often women who are violated. It is also true that 
sexual offence complainants are more likely to be asked about their sexual experience, or to have their 
third party records sought. How do these facts give rise to a violation of the equality right? When a 
Charter challenge is brought against a statutory provision based on an equality rights violation, a precise 
legal test is employed for identifying whether there is a violation. I do not think that test is met in sexual 
offence cases, simply because the accused is seeking to access evidence. I am not sure how, for example, 
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I also continue to be troubled by the way that these competing constitutional 
rights are applied, once recognized. For example, even if there are constitutional 
privacy interests in complainants, why is it that every social policy interest 
supporting the suppression of evidence (including the impact of disclosure on 
reporting, or the readiness of complainants to obtain therapy), whether it has 
anything to do with the privacy interest of the complainant or not, is treated as 
though it shelters under that constitutional right?  
I continue to be troubled, as well, that we allow these competing constitutional 
rights to offset the claim by the accused to full answer and defence without ever 
determining whether compromising those competing constitutional claims could be 
justified under section 1 of the Charter. If those compromises could be justified 
under section 1, and we fail to find this out, then, without knowing it, we are 
effectively neutralizing a real Charter claim by the accused with what is only a 
prima facie Charter violation of the right of the complainant. In such a case, there 
should be no detente. The accused‟s right should be a right of higher order and 
thereby less capable of being compromised. But we never use section 1 to find out. 
Finally, I am troubled about where this is all going to lead. The implications are 
not confined to due process. In his book, Due Process and Victim’s Rights: The 
New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice,23 Professor Kent Roach demonstrates 
how offences, primarily involving groups perceived to be vulnerable,24 were 
upheld against Charter challenge, largely by pitting the claims of accused persons 
against the equality and security rights of victims and potential victims. The key 
assumptions being made in these cases were that the creation and prosecution of 
offences can control crime, and that the successful prosecution of offences can 
protect security interests.25 Professor Roach expressed his doubts about the efficacy 
of those assumptions, doubts that I share. However, whatever one thinks about the 
ability of the criminal prosecution to reduce crime, what is important is that 
Professor Roach has identified, in effect, the phenomenon of recognizing a 
constitutional right in persons, particularly in identifiable classes of persons 
thought to be vulnerable, to be free from harm. That constitutional right to be free 
from harm is then used, and can be used, to offset virtually any constitutional claim 
being made by the accused. In essence, the very notions of crime and the criminal 
                                                                                                                                
given that both men and women are sexual assault complainants, rules that operate the same for both 
sexes give rise to “differential treatment.” I thought that section 15 has to do with “qualitative” rather 
than “quantitative” differences. Nor am I sure how it would amount to a form of “discrimination” for 
accused persons to seek access to “significant” information. Perhaps there are persuasive responses, but 
none of these questions has ever been discussed. We have simply proclaimed competing rights. 
23
  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). 
24
 The examples he uses include “prostitution” (where the prostitutes are construed to be 
victims), hate propaganda and pornography. 
25
 Roach, Due Process and Victim’s Rights: The New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice, 
supra, note 23, at 150. 
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prosecution are reconfigured and conceptualized as contests not between the state 
and the accused, but between the accused and those vulnerable victims who might 
be harmed by the crime he or she is charged with. 
Not surprisingly, the notional conversion of a criminal prosecution (and the 
constitutional issues that arise within it) into a dispute between the accused and the 
victim weakens dramatically all of the constitutional rights that an accused might 
claim. Consider R. v. Sharpe.26 The dissenters in that case began their judgment 
with a plea for context, saying: 
 
In the context of this case, the twin considerations of social justice and equality 
warrant society‟s active protection of its vulnerable members. Democratic and 
constitutional principles dictate that every member of society be treated with dignity 
and respect and accorded full participation in society. In this sense, government 
legislation that protects the vulnerable plays a vital role. Given our democratic values, 
it is clear that the Charter must not be used to reverse advances made by vulnerable 
groups or to defeat measures intended to protect the disadvantaged and 
comparatively powerless members of society.27 
 
This last sentence, in particular, should send a chill down the back of any 
criminal defence lawyer. Not only does it give equal weight to the perceived rights 
of the vulnerable in a contest with the constitutional claims of the accused, but it 
purports to give presumptive weight as against the Charter rights of the accused to 
perceived “gains” made on behalf of the vulnerable. 
This aside, what the dissenting justices were doing was to conceive of the 
contest before them as between the claim of the accused to freedom of expression 
(a right they would have denied even existed in the case) and the claims of 
vulnerable, disadvantaged members of society seeking equality. At one time, it was 
considered that in a criminal prosecution, it is the accused who is the vulnerable 
one. During the trial, the accused stands before the awesome power that the state 
has to deprive him or her of his or her liberty, a state that is bringing its 
considerable resources to bear in order to brand him or her a criminal, and to 
punish him or her. Remove the state from the equation, and the accused is no 
longer vulnerable. Invoke the constitutional equality rights of complainants 
(conceptualized as the right of future victims of the vulnerable class to be free from 
victimization so that they can flourish in society), and put those complainants in the 
place of the state, and it is not the rights of the accused that require protection. 
Context, balance and even the issues of concern are altered dramatically. The claim 
of the accused is seen as being brought on behalf of victimizers, and it is seen as a 
claim being tendered against victims, not against the state. When we conceive of 
constitutional adjudication in this way, we do disservice to the presumption of 
_______________________________________________________________ 
26
 (2001), 194 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2001 SCC 2. 
27
 Id., at para. 133 (emphasis added). 
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innocence, and we debilitate the Charter rights of the accused. It is something of an 
understatement to say that in such a regime, things do not bode well for the rights 
of the accused. 
III. THE RECOGNITION OF PRO-STATE “PRINCIPLES OF 
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE” 
A related conception that can dull the ability of the accused to rely on 
constitutional rights, already alluded to above, is the denial to the accused of 
property over “full answer and defence” and “fair trial” rights. The gravamen of 
these rights is that they exist to preserve the presumption of innocence. This was 
appreciated fully in Seaboyer. The majority of the Court said: 
 
The right of the innocent not to be convicted is dependent on the right to present full 
answer and defence. This, in turn, depends on being able to call the evidence necessary 
to establish a defence and to challenge the evidence called by the prosecution. ... 
Procedural limitations make possible the conviction of persons who the criminal law 
says are innocent. 28 
 
Even before Seaboyer was decided,29 it was understood, however, that whether 
there has been a violation of section 7 requires a balancing of competing interests. 
A “contextual approach which takes into account the nature of the decision to be 
made [is to] be adopted.”30 The fortunes of a claim by the accused to principles of 
fundamental justice depends largely, therefore, on how that balancing is to be 
conducted, what the nature of the competing considerations are, and on the level of 
commitment by judges to those traditional, liberty-regarding principles on which 
the accused relies. This injects an inherent fragility into any claim by the accused 
that his or her rights, as secured by the principles of fundamental justice, have been 
compromised. Notwithstanding this, in Seaboyer, the section 7 balancing process 
had little effect because of the high level of priority given to the principle that the 
innocent not be convicted. The only real issue in identifying whether there was a 
breach concerned whether the impugned legislation could have the effect of 
depriving the accused of access to evidence that could assist materially in his 
defence. The principle of fundamental justice was “that the innocent not be 
punished,” and if the accused was deprived of evidence that was needed to present 
a defence, then there was a constitutional violation. 
Since Seaboyer the matter has not been as straightforward. Our practice has 
been to evaluate context, and to treat “full answer and defence” and even of the 
_______________________________________________________________ 
28
 R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 608. 
29
 See Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive 
Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at 539. 
30
 Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, at 848. 
(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)    Competing Constitutional Rights 123 
 
 
Job Name: SCLR14      Time:00:28       1st proofs  Date:Saturday, February 11, 2012 
right to a “fair trial” as rights whose content in a particular case will vary as a 
matter of internal limitation, depending on competing considerations. The “fairness 
of the trial” must be assessed “from the point of view of fairness in the eyes of the 
community and the complainant and not just the accused.”31 As described above, 
“the scope of the right to make full answer and defence must be determined in light 
of privacy and equality rights of complainants and witnesses.”32 It is now 
recognized, as well, that full answer and defence and the right to a fair trial, must 
also be “defined in a context that includes other principles of fundamental 
justice.”33  Indeed, we have been balancing the rights of the accused against what 
we are treating as “pro-state” principles of fundamental justice. 
R. v. Burns involved a challenge to the discretion of the Minister of Justice to 
extradite Burns and Rafay to stand trial for murder in the United States, without 
first obtaining assurances that the young men would not be capitally punished if 
convicted. The Court, after engaging in a contextual analysis of competing 
considerations, ultimately ruled that the deportation would violate section 7. The 
Court had performed a similar section 7 balancing approach in 1991 in Kindler v. 
Canada (Minister of Justice)34 before deciding that the extradition in that case 
would not violate section 7. There are, however, two differences in the way the 
balancing was performed in Burns. First, the Court in Burns disclaimed that the 
“shocks the conscience” standard relied on in Burns had to be met for a violation 
of section 7 to occur. It was enough if the extradition contravened the principles of 
fundamental justice. Second, and more germane to the current discussion, when 
balancing competing interests, it notionally elevated a number of state interests to 
the stature of what were effectively “competing principles of fundamental justice.” 
Those “basic tenets of our legal system” included that “individuals accused of a crime 
should be brought to trial to determine the truth of the charges,”35 that “justice is best 
served by a trial in the jurisdiction where the crime was allegedly committed,”36 that 
“individuals who choose to leave Canada leave behind Canadian law and 
procedures,”37 and that “extradition is based on the principles of comity and 
fairness to other co-operating states.”38  When the mix was done, the “anti-
extradition” factors prevailed, most notably the principle of fundamental justice 
that the innocent not be punished. This principle would be defeated were there to 
be a wrongful conviction that could not subsequently be corrected because of the 
execution of the wrongfully convicted subject. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
31
 R. v. Mills, supra, note 15, at para. 72, quoting R. v. E. (A.W.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 155. 
32
 R. v. Darrach (2000), 148 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at para. 28 (S.C.C.) 
33
 R. v. Mills, supra, note 15, at para. 76.  
34
  [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779. 
35
  United States of America v. Burns (2001), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2001 SCC 7, at para. 72. 
36
  Id. 
37
 Id. 
38
  Id. 
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Similarly, in R. v. McClure,39 the Court engaged in a balancing between what 
were described as competing principles of fundamental justice. McClure was 
charged with a sexual offence against a young person who subsequently 
commenced a civil action. He sought access to the solicitor-client files relating to 
that action, and the trial judge granted it, ordering access to the file. That order was 
stayed pending appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada under section 40 of the 
Supreme Court Act.40 The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately denied the accused 
access, but not before balancing the principle of fundamental justice relied on by the 
accused to gain access against the principle of fundamental justice of solicitor-client 
privilege. Interestingly, the Court did not focus on the complainant‟s privacy interest 
in the particular solicitor-client communications. Instead, it considered the more 
general question of the importance of the “solicitor-client relationship” to the legal 
system and to society. The effect of this was to permit considerations of general 
social utility to compromise the claim by the accused. The principle of fundamental 
justice relied on by the accused was met with, and ultimately defeated by, a pro-
state principle of fundamental justice. 
I worry about the treatment of pro-state factors as principles of fundamental 
justice that need to be balanced against the constitutional rights of the accused. 
These pro-extradition factors in Burns and the “pro-confidentiality” factors in 
McClure are no doubt important objectives for a legal system. They may well even 
be basic tenets of our system of justice. But should they be treated as competing 
principles of fundamental justice tenable by the state? Section 7 of the Charter 
provides that: 
 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
 
Section 7 is found, of course, in a constitutional document. A constitutional 
document is one that imposes limits on state power. Read in that context, it strikes 
me that the relevant principles of fundamental justice that are guaranteed to 
“everyone” are those principles that are relevant to the protection of the life, liberty 
and security of the person of the Charter claimant. The section is meant to give 
constitutional standing to those principles of fundamental justice that limit state 
power, not those principles of fundamental justice that favour state interests, either 
generally, such as the “pro-extradition” factors described above, or in the context 
_______________________________________________________________ 
39
 2001, 195 D.L.R. (4th) 513, 2001 SCC 14. 
40
 R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26. Section 40 (as am.) has become the refuge of third parties who seek to 
appeal interim orders which affect them directly in criminal cases. There is no right to appeal to 
provincial courts of appeal from superior courts in such cases. An application for leave must be made to 
the Supreme Court of Canada and then granted. This is a woefully impractical way to review interim 
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legislative amendment to provide a more efficient and practical avenue of appeal. 
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of a specific case, such as the “pro-confidentiality” factors inherent in solicitor-
client privilege. Again, I am not suggesting that these kinds of factors should not 
have been weighed in the process. Of course, they should have been. What I am 
suggesting, however, is that by treating them as competing principles of 
fundamental justice having the same legal status as the principles of fundamental 
justice that the accused is tendering denudes the constitutional principles that the 
accused relies on of any of their a priori weight. I suspect, for example, that a case 
could be made that it is a basic tenet of our legal system that people have the right 
not to be injured by others, and that it is a basic tenet of our legal system that the 
guilty should be punished. If we placed these basic tenets into the hopper as 
competing principles of fundamental justice every time a criminal defendant 
claimed constitutional rights, there would no longer be any pre-emptive, 
constitutional currency in those principles relied on by the accused. Grant it, Burns 
and Rafay‟s right prevailed, and the particular outcome in McClure might have 
been resolved the same way without conjuring up competing principles of 
fundamental justice, but this is an important point, both symbolically and as a 
matter of principle. In undertaking the balancing process in a system intent on 
protecting constitutional rights, there must be presumptive weight given to the 
constitutional principles that the accused is relying on; however, the practice of 
recognizing competing state-based principles of fundamental justice obscures this. 
IV. THE “NO-TRUMP” THEORY 
In R. v. Seaboyer, principles of fundamental justice necessary to ensure 
innocence were accorded inherent priority over competing considerations. Dealing 
with the competing claim of privacy, the majority held: 
 
Finally, the justification of maintaining privacy of the witness fails to support the rigid 
exclusionary rule embodied in s. 276 of the Code. First, it can be argued that important 
as it is to take all measures possible to ease the plight of the witness, the constitutional 
right to a fair trial must take precedence in case of conflict.41 
 
This priority for full answer and defence appears no longer to exist, at least not 
with respect to competing constitutional interests. The case of Dagenais v. 
Canadian Broadcasting Corp.42 involved a “clash” between the accused‟s claim to 
his right to a fair trial and the freedom of expression of CBC to broadcast a movie 
depicting incidents that bore resemblance to the allegations against the accused, 
and which could possibly influence potential jurors. The accused asserted that his 
right to a fair trial should prevail. The Court responded: 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
41
 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 617. 
42
 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. 
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A hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others, must be avoided, 
both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the common law. When the 
protected rights of two individuals come into conflict, as can occur in the case of 
publication bans, Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully respects 
the importance of both sets of rights.43 
 
This “no trump” doctrine has been repeated in other cases. In R. v. Mills44 the 
majority of the Court, speaking of “full answer and defence, privacy, and equality” 
said that “[n]o single principle is absolute and capable of trumping the others. …”45 
As described above, the issue of a clash between competing constitutional rights 
arose again in R. v. McClure.46 The Court, referring to “full answer and defence” 
on the one hand, and the principle of fundamental justice of solicitor-client 
privilege on the other, stated that “[the] importance of both of these rights means 
that neither can always prevail.”47 
The “no trump” doctrine is a devastating development for the accused. At best, 
it requires compromise where compromise is often not possible. If the evidence or 
procedure is indeed necessary to answer the case fully, there is no meaningful 
compromise possible because the right is vindicated absolutely only by giving 
access to it, and denied absolutely by denying access to it. At worst, it enables 
courts to select competing considerations over the rights of the accused, even 
where, ex hypothesi, that evidence or that procedure is essential to full answer and 
defence.  
In practice, it seems, the “no trump” assertion has proven to be easy to state, but, 
in most cases, difficult to stick with. When push comes to shove, courts have most 
often continued to recognize a primacy in the principle that the innocent not be 
convicted. The Court in Dagenais was able to prefer the freedom of the press to 
broadcast its movie only because it was satisfied that Dagenais could still get a fair 
trial, despite the broadcast. It is inconceivable that the Court would have preferred 
broadcast rights of a corporation for entertainment purposes to the potential loss of 
liberty of an innocent person had it been otherwise. Even in R. v. Mills, the Court 
found it necessary to say that “the accused‟s right must prevail [over competing 
interests] where the lack of disclosure or production of the record would render 
him unable to make full answer and defence.”48 And in R. v. McClure, the right of 
the accused to make full answer and defence was said to prevail where “there is a 
genuine danger of wrongful conviction.”49   
_______________________________________________________________ 
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 Id., at para. 61. 
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 Id., at para. 42. 
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 Supra, note 44, at para. 89. 
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 Supra, note 39, at para. 49. 
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The readiness of courts to express priority for full answer and defence where 
innocence is at stake does not remove the damage that the “no trump” doctrine has 
created. Invariably, in an effort to find a compromise between competing rights 
where there is no real compromise possible, the Court will create or endorse the 
creation of “hurdles” that the accused must cross before enjoying the constitutional 
right. Legal tests are developed in which it is assumed that if there really is 
significant evidence available, or a real danger of wrongful conviction, the hurdles 
imposed by these legal tests will be successfully navigated. Unfortunately, this is 
not so. Those hurdles are invariably problematic, as much so for the innocent 
accused as for the guilty.  
The rigid regime established in McClure is illustrative. The Court developed a 
test that involves a two-stage process. “Before the test is even considered,” 
however, “the accused must establish that the information he is seeking in the 
solicitor-client file is not available from any other source and [that] he is otherwise 
unable to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt in any other way.”50 With respect, 
the requirement that the accused be unable to raise a reasonable doubt in another 
way is an impractical one. The accused will only know if he or she can raise a 
reasonable doubt at the end of the trial, when the verdict is in. What is to happen 
where the judge has denied access because there appeared at the time to be another 
way for the accused to raise a reasonable doubt, but where that other way proved 
not to be successful? Is the judge to reopen the trial and grant access, or is the 
accused to remain convicted, having been denied access on what proved to be an 
erroneous assumption? The first alternative is implausible, the second intolerable. 
Assuming that the accused can jump that pre-test hurdle, at the first stage of the 
test the issue is whether the judge should inspect the solicitor‟s file. To get the 
judge to look at it, the onus is on the accused to provide an evidentiary basis upon 
which to conclude that there exists a communication that could raise a reasonable 
doubt. This will be difficult enough to accomplish, given that the communications 
contained in the file are privileged pending that ruling, and cannot be asked about, 
even if the accused is fortunate enough to have one of those rare cases where he or 
she is entitled to a preliminary inquiry. The accused is met with the classic catch-
22 situation that bedevils all constitutional discovery processes in which the onus is 
placed on the accused.  
There is another significant hurdle. “[W]hen the accused is either challenging 
credibility or raising collateral matters, it [is said to be] difficult to meet the 
standards required of stage one”51 (this, notwithstanding that in most sexual 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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offence cases, where access to civil litigation files is most likely to arise, the only 
issue will be credibility).52  
If the accused manages to jump these hurdles, the trial judge inspects the file. 
The trial judge is to determine whether, in fact, there exists a communication that is 
likely to raise a reasonable doubt as to the accused‟s guilt. In other words, the trial 
judge is not to hand over relevant information that is discovered, even if that 
information could raise a reasonable doubt. The judge is simply to close the file 
back up and try the accused as though information that could raise a reasonable 
doubt, of which he or she has become aware, does not exist. The final nail in the 
coffin of any realistic attempt by accused persons to secure access to solicitor-
client files occurred with the Court observing that “in most cases,” this second 
branch of the test cannot be met by evidence that relates to the credibility of the 
complainant. 
Without question, the process of balancing is a challenging one, apt to satisfy no 
one. I do not envy the Court in the difficult task it must perform. The effect of 
regimes like that which has been adopted in McClure, however, is that the accused 
is unlikely to get to the point where, if “significant evidence” does exist, it will 
ever be discovered. We will never know. This might enable us to assume that there 
has been full answer and defence, even though there has not been, but it will do 
little to ensure that the innocent are not convicted.53 
 
V. CONFUSION BETWEEN “DIALOGUE” AND “DEFERENCE” 
Prior to the Charter, it was the recognized function of courts to ensure that 
accused persons had fair trials. With the proclamation of the Charter, courts 
received a new tool to assist in discharging this obligation. In R. v. Collins we see 
the bold statement of Justice Lamer, as he then was, that courts are the “only 
effective shelter for individuals and unpopular minorities from the shifting winds 
of public passion,”54 and he spoke of how the “Charter is designed to protect the 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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 The line between credibility and proof of innocence is not always clear. If she claims in one 
statement that she was sexually assaulted, but in another says that she was not, is the denial to be treated 
as evidence relating to the credibility of her allegation, or is it to be considered proof that nothing 
happened? To attempt to rest doctrine on the line between credibility and innocence is worrisome, both 
because it is destined to be difficult to apply, and because it undervalues the central importance of 
credibility in sexual offence cases. 
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 I agree that almost invariably the defence will be enough to present its theory simply by 
showing that the complainant has launched a civil suit and is seeking financial gain from the allegation. 
The McClure decision is, therefore, not one of monumental practical import. It is nonetheless one of 
symbolic significance given that an access regime that is virtually impossible to meet, even in a case 
where there is important evidence in the file, has been identified as constitutionally satisfactory. 
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accused from the majority, so the enforcement of the Charter must not be left to 
that majority.”55 In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General),56 Justice 
McLachlin rejected the assertion that the matter before the Court in that case, 
assisted suicide, was a policy matter unfit for constitutional adjudication given the 
sharp division of public opinion. She said: 
 
Were the task before me that of taking the pulse of the nation, I too should quail ... I 
do not, however, see this as the task which faces the Court in this case. We are not 
asked to second guess Parliament‟s objective of criminalizing [assisted] suicide. Our 
task was the much more modest one of determining whether, … the legislative scheme 
regulating suicide which Parliament has put in place ... [comports] with the principles 
of fundamental justice.57 
 
Together, these remarks capture, what is in my view, the appropriate division of 
responsibility between courts and democratic institutions. Courts are to ensure that 
basic principles are not sacrificed in the public interest because of the shifting 
winds of public passion, unless this can be demonstrably justified by the state 
agency that is seeking to do so. Courts are not to perform the work of legislators. 
They are simply to show legislators where the constitutional limits are.  
The need to be the guardians of where constitutional lines are to be drawn is 
particularly important in matters of criminal process. Judges, particularly trial 
judges, are expert in such matters. They are the ones who witness the application of 
these procedures, who understand them and the reasons for them. More 
importantly, judges, including appellate judges, are the ones who possess the 
institutional memory, through precedent and established principle, that has 
accumulated throughout hundreds of years of history. It is by relying on 
institutional memory and experience that judges can appreciate the long-range 
implications of the decisions they make about criminal law principles. It is because 
of their removal from political pressure, their expertise in matters of criminal 
process and, most importantly, their access to institutional memory that judges 
have long been relied on as the guardians of a fair trial process. Even in the most 
sober of times, it is, therefore, courts that must protect the rights of accused 
persons. By contrast, legislators, for their own political survival, must react to 
politically popular causes to fashion politically popular solutions. It is, therefore, a 
matter of great calamity that it is now, a time when unprecedented pressure for law 
and order initiatives is coming from both left and right, and where the desire to 
make the law tougher and more punitive has affected all parties at all levels of 
government, that we have chosen to create a tool for unprecedented deference to 
the views of legislators about the very definition of rights. I am referring to the 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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brand of “constitutional dialogue” that was embraced in the decision in R. v. 
Mills.58 In my opinion, it is a conception of “constitutional dialogue” that confuses 
“deference” with “dialogue.” 
The idea of “dialogue” was imported by the Court from American scholarship, 
through the introduction given to it in an article by Dean Peter Hogg and Allison 
A. Bushell.59  In their article, Hogg and Bushell describe “constitutional dialogue” 
as existing “where a judicial decision is open to reversal, modification or 
avoidance,”60 and where the legislature responds to a Charter decision. They 
explain that “the dialogue that culminates in a democratic decision can only take 
place if the judicial decision to strike down a law can be reversed, modified or 
avoided by the ordinary legislative process.”61 In other words, the dialogue 
involves Parliament expressing its views, the Court responding by demonstrating 
where the lines are, and Parliament then responding to that message.  
Most cases involve legislation being “modified” or “avoided.” The legislation is 
amended to avoid the constitutional impediment that the prior law contained, 
whether this is accomplished by deleting or substituting an offending characteristic, 
or by making the law more minimally impairing. In this form of dialogue, a new 
law comes back in a form that is more respectful of the constitutional limits 
pointed out by the courts. R. v. Darrach62 provides the perfect illustration. 
Parliament responded with legislation in an effort to track the constitutional 
guidance that had been provided by the Supreme Court of Canada.  
What, then, of “reversal?” How can a judicial Charter decision be “reversed” by 
legislation? It can be “reversed” for some Charter rights by reliance on section 33, 
the opt-out provision. There is no other mechanism contemplated in the Charter 
through which legislators can reverse the impact of Charter provisions. 
What is important is that in each of these kinds of cases — “modification or 
avoidance” and “reversal” — the “dialogue”about what the constitutional law is 
culminates with the response of the legislator. Nowhere does the concept of 
dialogue discussed by Hogg and Bushell contemplate courts reversing their prior 
decisions on the definition of rights after the legislators have “dialogued” back. 
Courts might overturn the responding legislation again because it has not gone far 
enough to correct the problem, but there is no suggestion that courts should 
hearken to the opinions of legislators about where the Court should have drawn the 
lines. Once the Court has spoken, the nature of the dialogue contemplated is for 
legislators to respond to either with legislation that does a better job of respecting 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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59
 “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn‟t 
Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997), 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. 
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rights or by using the opt-out provision, the tool that the Charter provided them 
with for avoiding the constraints of the Constitution.  
What is unhealthy, in my opinion, about the concept of dialogue that was 
embraced in Mills is that it involved the Court hearkening to a legislative response 
to their decision in R. v. O’Connor,63 which response rejected the constitutional 
lines that the Court had identified. Parliament‟s response was that it did not like the 
lines drawn by the Court,64 and the Court‟s response was to listen, and to allow that 
to be of influence. The Court hearkened to Parliament without insisting on 
Parliament‟s use of section 33, and without even putting the onus on Parliament 
under section 1 to justify its departure from those standards. Dialogue effectively 
became a mechanism whereby the Court chose to defer to government‟s decision to 
redraw the lines about the scope of rights: “Courts do not hold a monopoly on the 
protection and promotion of rights and freedoms,” the Court said. “Parliament also 
plays a role in this regard .... [T]his court has an obligation to consider respectfully 
Parliament‟s attempt to respond to [the voices of those vulnerable to being 
overlooked by the majority].”65  
I have a number of concerns about this conception of constitutional dialogue. 
First, in my opinion, it degrades the force of all Charter decisions. Are particular 
decisions those in which lines are drawn, or are they those representing one of a 
range of acceptable responses about which dialogue can be conducted? The very 
prospect of reconsideration invites a game of ping-pong. Second, constitutional 
litigation may be a unique form of litigation, but it is still a contest between the 
state and the citizen. Where else, in law, do courts engage in dialogue with party 
litigants in which they revisit legal issues based on the post-litigation response of 
one of the party litigants as to how they feel the rights of their opposing party 
litigant should be defined? If the Mills form of dialogue is like a game of ping-
pong, the Charter claimant is the only one without a paddle. Third, this form of 
dialogue, in which the very definition of rights is to be reconsidered, obviates the 
need for government to use those structures that the Charter designed for brokering 
_______________________________________________________________ 
63
 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. 
64
 The reader should understand that the Court in Mills concluded that O’Connor was a common 
law decision in which a balance was struck: supra, note 44, at para 55. It is not to be read as a case 
defining the balance. Nowhere in O’Connor, however, did the Court signal that any lesser form of access 
to third-party records than that which it was defining would suffice. Indeed, if lesser access would suffice, it 
follows that the Court in O’Connor inexplicably decided to give accused persons more than they were 
constitutionally entitled to, notwithstanding the competing claims of privacy and equality considered by the 
Court. 
65
 R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 58. One cannot help but ask, if those voices were 
vulnerable to being overlooked by the majority, why was it that they were the ones being championed in 
legislation presented by the majority? It is my perception, at least, that in sexual offence cases, the least 
recorded voices are those of persons accused of the crime. The very accusation is so stigmatizing that it 
taints anyone who stands with the accused. Protecting the rights of the accused, particularly in sexual 
offence cases, is not a cause that elected members of the majority tend to champion. 
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state interests against individual rights, namely section 33 and section 1. This 
makes it much easier for rights to be abridged. Fourth, one of the salutary impacts 
of Supreme Court Charter decisions is that they inspire compliance checks in the 
Department of Justice to see whether proposed legislation will meet the 
requirements of the Charter. Now, every opinion has to be prefaced with the 
answer, “it all depends on how the dialogue goes.” It is not so much the simple fact 
of uncertainty that is troubling; it is that the concept of dialogue encourages greater 
risk-taking by legislators with the rights of Canadians, including accused persons. 
It takes years before the constitutionality of criminal enactments are finally 
resolved, and in the meantime, people are convicted on their strength. Fifth, and 
most troubling, this form of dialogue sends the message that the function of courts 
of protecting the rights of the accused is up for negotiation. It is up for further 
dialogue. If, prior to Mills, Charter litigation was about drawing lines, the 
conception of dialogue employed in Mills has the potential to change the medium. 
Lines are no longer drawn in law. They are drawn in sand. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have indulged myself from time to time in this paper by recording my protests 
and concerns, even where those protests and concerns are now no more than a 
record of historically insignificant regret. The law is the law, whatever I might 
happen to think. It is nonetheless important for those who work within, or 
otherwise influence the system, to be aware of trends and developments and to 
appreciate their full implications. I have, therefore, attempted to identify 
fundamental conceptual changes in the adjudication of Charter rights and to expose 
how they bode poorly for the rights of accused persons. My hope, of course, is that 
this will encourage sober second thought by judges, and alert counsel to what is 
happening. Most notable is the technique of neutralizing the constitutional rights of 
accused persons by recognizing competing constitutional rights of complainants, or 
even those of future victims of the kind of crime the accused is charged with. This, 
coupled with the “no trump”doctrine, denudes the accused‟s Charter rights of any 
presumptive force. The two constitutional rights, neither able to trump the other, 
become non-players, permitting judges to strike any balance between competing 
considerations they choose. The recognition of “principles of fundamental justice” 
that express state interests produces the same effect. State principles of 
fundamental justice, because they too are constitutional principles, have the same 
legal stature as do those principles relied on by the accused. This effectively 
deprives the principles relied on by the accused of the presumptive superiority over 
competing state interests that a true constitutional principle must, by definition, 
enjoy. Finally, if the surrogacy of “victim” for “state” in the constitutional 
litigation does not succeed in producing a balance that is acceptable to the state, it 
can respond to the Court decision by attempting to “dialogue” in the hope that the 
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Court will defer to its rejection of the solution adopted by the Court. I think that 
together these developments demonstrate the point that I have been seeking to 
make. When it comes to protecting the interests of the accused, the Charter is not 
what it once was. We conceive of claims by the accused against the state in a 
wholly different fashion than we once did.  
The process by which this has happened is a testament to legal imagination and 
creativity. I say this only as a grudging compliment because these developments 
diminish fundamental principles and long-standing rights. They invariably depreciate 
our commitment to the protection of the innocent. This entire change in focus in our 
constitutional adjudication bears witness to what is doubtlessly the key truth in the 
struggle for human flourishing. It is not legal text that secures liberty. Only a shared 
commitment to liberty regarding principles can do so. The promise of the Charter for 
accused persons, as well as for all of us as potential accused persons, is being called into 
question because, in our desire to protect victims from horrid crimes, we have, in my 
respectful opinion, lost sight of our shared commitment to liberty regarding principles.  
Three things are needed to reclaim that shared commitment. The first is clear 
and constant recognition by the courts that the worst evil that society can perpetrate 
on its citizens is the conviction of the innocent, and that the principle against the 
conviction of the innocent, including the right to full answer and defence, has a 
higher value in a criminal case than competing constitutional claims. The second is 
the resolve to ensure that any tests or mechanisms designed to preserve that 
principle are realistic and practically attainable. The third is the readiness to 
prevent the concept of dialogue from being used as a tool for legislative deference 
when the Court has already spoken. If these things are done, the new constitutional 
regime, as unattractive and puzzling as it is, may not wreak the havoc on the rights 
of accused persons that it is now threatening to. 
